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ABSTRACT
In the past, satellites were designed without adequately discussing 
issues with the users. This is an extremely poor business practice; if 
the acquisition community were a competitive business, that attitude 
would be considered a precursor to failure. A change in attitude com- 
parable to the customer awareness inherent in a competitive environment 
would have several positive benefits. First, product design would be 
tailored to the customer's real needs. Second, this awareness would 
foster searching out the most cost-effective (in terms of time, money, 
technology, etc.) methods of providing equipment.
INTRODUCTION
Warfighting commands need sustainable and survivable lines of 
communications. This statement should come as no surprise to anyone; 
communications are vital to a coordinated warfighting effort, and serve 
to insure maximum utilization of resources. This principle has been 
recorded as early as Sun Tzu, who wrote "And to control many is the same 
as to control few. This is a matter of formations and signals." Many 
battles throughout history have been lost for lack of a crucial piece of 
information being either relayed or received in a timely manner.
Operational communications requirements are ultimately translated into 
such vehicles as command networks or conference bridges, secure voice or 
data systems, data relay systems, or any of many other possible methods 
of achieving transference of needed information. Some of these vehicles 
will require partial or total reliance on satellite communications to 
achieve their long-haul links.
The usual way for the user to communicate this desire for satellite 
communications support is to submit a request for inclusion in the User 
Requirements Data Base. Periodically, these new submissions are 
reviewed for validation. If validated, additional processing is 
required; its nature is dependent on the satellite system for which the 
request was approved. When these requirements are presented to the 
acquisition community, they come in the form of compiled data. The 
identity of the users and urgency of their needs do not get 
transferred with the data.
One might ask why this would be of any importance to the acquisition 
community; after all, satellites are designed to fulfill specifications 
that come directly from that compiled data. This is true; however, that
compiled data does not relay information about application and the cost 
to the user if that capability is not available. The sense of urgency 
that such information imparts is critical to an attitude analogous to 
"competitive edge" in a commercial concern. The statement "We need a 
satellite that will pass X megabits per s second" is hardly inspiring, and 
would motivate very few people to work faster, harder, or smarter. If 
you take the same requirements and also define them as "We need a 
satellite that will enable CINCSAC to place their bombers optimally in 
case of an attack on CONUS, and will enable CINCSPACE to get real-time 
missile information, etc.", people will see a need and gain a time 
awareness for them - assuming they have had certain experiences or have 
been in the military for a sufficient length of time.
A lack of common core of communications between the operational and 
acquisition communities lies at the heart of the problem. 
Traditionally, there has been little one-on-one interaction between 
these two communities. This has been compounded by the acquisition 
community being somewhat insular in nature. PCS moves from one product 
division to another give people little exposure to the operational 
military. Program offices have few people who have had direct exposure 
to warfighting needs; many of these people hold AFSCs that are not 
traditionally tied to Systems Command, and consequently are not 
guaranteed to stay within the command for more than one tour. 
Additionally, a significant number of program office personnel are on 
their first assignment, and carry with them no sense of how the military 
really functions. Cumulatively, this results in an acquisition 
community that at the working level has little feel for how the 
operational commands accomplish their missions.
A BUSINESS ANALYSIS
Before we can analyze whether methods employed by the acquisition 
community can be improved upon, let us review what the customer really 
wants. The ultimate desire is for communications service - to enable 
information to be relayed to or received from someone else. There are 
three corollary desires in obtaining that service:
The user desires 100% requirements satisfaction
The user desires this satisfaction to be met in 
conjunction with his real-time needs
The user desires usable end-to-end service
Operational commanders have to maintain lines of communications 
appropriate to both their peacetime and wartime roles and 
responsibilities. Additionally, operational commanders are as keenly 
aware of budget constraints as the acquisition community; their stated 
requirements are not frivolously submitted. Also, consider that 
networks do not consist of space on a satellite alone; these networks
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represent considerable capital outlay to the operational commander's budget in terms of commercial ground circuits, terminal equipment, user 
consoles, etc. If that space on a satellite is not available, the 
entire network may be rendered useless.
This takes us to the issue of real-time satisfaction. Even though the 
satellite communications requirement is not met, the operational 
requirement does not go away. The command can either reconfigure the 
network to incorporate lower capabilities which can be satisfied, or 
they can wait to be satisfied at some point in the future.
The last desire is a issue of system design and timeline coordination. 
A satellite cannot stand alone; nor can a ground terminal. It is of no 
use to the operational commander for one component of the communications 
system to be in place and functional while other components are delayed in delivery.
Now, if one were to establish a corporation that intended to compete for 
this customer ! s business, what measures would they be likely to take? 
They would first make it their business to know this customer - what he 
wanted, how he intended to use it, what cost if the product desired were 
not available. They would create an atmosphere where continuous dialog between themselves and the customer could flow, where impacts and 
tradeoffs could be discussed to the benefit of both parties. For 
example, a technology might surface that would give a slight gain in 
performance, at the cost to the customer of a one-year delay. The gain in performance might be worth it to most of the customers; but if not, 
and the company were to proceed anyway, all parties would lose. The 
customers would lose time and satisfaction; the company would lose money 
and effort better applied to other things. This company would produce a 
product which would be usable as a system; if they did not produce it 
solely in-house, the subcontractor portion would be closely coordinated 
and scheduled to come available on time. The system f s life-cycle 
requirements would also be factored in as a consideration in the overall 
product package.
Now if you compare this to contemporary acquisition practice, there are 
a few obvious differences. For the most part, our knowledge of the 
operational commanders' requirements relies on a huge data base and 
published analyses of requirements. These items, useful as they are, don f t convey the "big picture" as regards their use. They also don't impart a sense of under what conditions a delay in service would be deemed acceptable. Also, we don't tend to build systems under the aegis 
of one organization. Since we don't build as one system, there is a 
problem with life-cycle costs not being considered as a system. If 
funding is cut in one area, it can be detrimental to the whole system, 
regardless of its stage in the acquisition process.
The customer, of course, is going to choose the provider who can supply 
the service desired with minimum operational impact and maximum economy 
of effort. The customer is also likely to be more comfortable with the 
provider who is familiar with his needs and receptive to his inputs. 
These are qualities the acquisition community finds desirable when 
dealing with contractors. It should come as no surprise that the
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operational commands would find the qualities of an informed and 
system-oriented provider to be equally desirable in their acquisition 
community. In a market-driven environment, our approach would be doomed 
to failure, simply because someone else eventually will come on the 
scene who is committed to doing it better.
THE "COMPETITIVE EDGE 11
How do we get that "competitive edge", to do our best efforts with a 
sensitivity to our customers 1 needs? This is fairly straightforward 
with commercial concerns - the law of the marketplace prevails. You 
lose market share, you lose revenue; loss of revenue can mean loss of 
profits, or it can translate into less money to invest back into the 
capabilities of the company. Essentially, the competitive edge is 
external ly imposed.
We, on the other hand, do not have any competition to impose this 
heightened sense of awareness upon us. Therefore, we must commit to 
engender it within ourselves, the acquisition community. Though this is 
by no means an exhaustive list, there are three things we can do to 
improve our awareness:
Employ Total Quality Management techniques
Engage in direct interaction with relevant 
components in the 'user communities
- Disseminate operational "sense of urgency" 
to acquisition personnel
Total Quality Management (TQM) is being strongly advocated in the 
acquisition community. As one reviews Dr. Deming's Fourteen Points, the 
underlying themes of working together as a cohesive unit and striving 
always for top performance rise to the surface. As TQM awareness 
improves, one can expect our "competitive" performance to improve. TQM 
alone is not the answer; we also need to be aware of what we are trying 
to accomplish.
Interaction with the users should be an ongoing practice. This could 
prove to be an invaluable sanity check throughout the acquisition 
process. It is true that some program offices have people on staff with 
operational experience; however, there are many aspects to national 
defense. These staff personnel may not have appropriate experience, 
they may not be current, or they may not possess the "big picture". On 
the other hand, the operational commander's staff does. The best places 
to start are a command's Plans/Programs and Communications divisions.
There are a number of methods which could be employed to indoctrinate 
acquisition personnel on the impact of unavailable communications. I 
believe that there is none better than direct observance (or a
reasonable facsimile thereof). For example, as observers in a major 
exercise, acquisition personnel could observe firsthand the linear 
relationship between loss of communications and erosion of command and 
control. From there, it is simple to see the impact of not having the 
communications capability at all.
BENEFITS
Before we would commit ourselves to a course of maintaining open discussions with the users and soliciting their inputs on design 
considerations, we should first establish what there is to be gained. 
Our first gain would be design and schedule attuned to the operational 
commander's real needs. Of course, since there are a multitude of 
users, not all needs could be satisfied for all users. In some instances, the technology is not yet sufficient to their needs. But 
overall, the user f s needs and timelines would drive design and schedule, 
rather than technological fine-tuning.
Technological fine-tuning leads us to the second gain, which is cost 
effectiveness, in both time and money. State-of-the-art advances have 
to be evaluated as a tradeoff against needs; putting it another way, is 
what you gain technologically sufficient to offset what you lose in 
terms of timely service? If a majority of your users need the service 
now and the current technology is sufficient, then "improving" the design could be detrimental to the national defense. Without some sort 
of sanity check, there is also the real possibility of "improving" a 
program so often that it doesn f t gets built. Also, as you go further 
out in time, there are two fiscal dangers which must be considered. The longer ,a program drags out in acquisition, the more it costs to build. 
And, in these fiscally conservative times, there is the ever-present danger of budget cuts or cancellation. The best way to evaluate the impacts of a proposed design change is to talk to the people who need 
the service, and consider their inputs with the merit they 
deserve.
CONCLUSION
The operational and acquisition communities have been separated in the 
past by the lack of a common core of communications and a large 
collection of documents. As these communities come to work together in 
acquiring equipment designed to meet required capabilities, we will come 
closer to our common goal - defense of the United States and her allies.
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